VISITATION OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN MARY TO HER COUSIN ELIZABETH (Lk 1:39-45)

LK 1: 39-45

VISITATION OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN MARY TO HER COUSIN ELIZABETH

Today’s Gospel was taken from Luke (1: 39-45). It is about Mary’s visit to Elizabeth. The priest’s sermon in the Mass that I attended this afternoon has highlighted the mention about ‘Mary leaving in haste to meet her cousin, Elizabeth.’ The homily asked: ‘why did Mary have to leave in haste?’

Perhaps, one important conjecture that we could make as to why Mary had to see her cousin, Elizabeth, and she would even have to leave in haste, is to say that Mary perhaps, at this time, was also searching for a kind of explanation or meaning about her situation. We have of course heard of Mary’s fiat when she told the angel Gabriel, “Let it be done unto me according to your word” (Lk 1:38), but just like any normal person, she was also perhaps looking for a logical explanation about her situation. Why was she chosen? Why would she have to be pregnant when she had not known any man (Lk 1:34)?

One thing perhaps that we could learn from Mary’s predicament at this time is the fact that doubts do not necessarily equal to unbelief. In Mary’s case, it was quite clear, when she raised the question in verse 34, she already had the faith that moved her to pronounce the fiat in verse 38. Mary was and is always faithful. But, her faith does not also mean that she will not seek an explanation on was said to her by the Angel. Faith in this case does not take away the need to grapple with reason.

In the annunciation, Mary has given us an important lesson in faith. When we believe, it does not mean that we could no longer ask questions, and that we could no longer doubt. Sometimes, it is precisely our belief that may make us raise the questions and entertain some doubts. But the questioning and doubt of a believer is always one that leads to deeper faith, and not one that leads to faith’s abandonment. Such is Mary’s example in the annunciation.

The same perhaps can be said about the visitation. Mary is ‘leaving in haste.’ But why? Here we could see that the visitation account is a sequel of the annunciation. Even the questions of Mary revisit her at this moment. This could perhaps allow us to see why she needed to see Elizabeth. She needs to find answers for some of her questions, and Elizabeth is perhaps one of the best persons to go to.

Having conceived John at an age when Elizabeth thought that she could no longer get pregnant should not have also surprised Mary because that is basically the very same condition that she is in at the time of the visitation. The visit is an expression of trust, it’s an expression of a search, it speaks of a pilgrimage where the faithful engages himself in a pilgrimage towards the truth of the matter.

The visitation then also teaches us a thing or two. It first reminds us that we have many companions in our journey. There are many things in our life that may be difficult to explain. There could be many things in our life that is hard to bear, and some of them even would seem to be illogical. Mary’s gesture in her visit to Elizabeth invites us to trust others in our pilgrimage. Our stories may be personal, and could be owned by no one else but ourselves, but there are also stories in other peoples’ lives that are analogical to our own. In such case, it would be our conversations that will help us find the answers to some if not many of our questions. Though we might need to be cautious, we do not have to be afraid about mentioning our dilemmas to others.

Mary’s leaving in haste may have told us of the urgency of the search for explanations and answers. But, precisely, it is the act of ‘leaving’ that allows her ‘to arrive’ at Elizabeth’s house, and thereby bring the grace of Christ to Elizabeth while in return being bestowed with the kind of assurance that a co-pilgrim like Elizabeth could provide. Mary is inviting all of us to ‘leave’ or to ‘abandon’ many things in our life; where such ‘leaving’ becomes pre-requisite for our openness to other. We need not to be afraid to be exposed to vulnerabilities and uncertainties. What we need is to be reminded always that those deficiencies may not forever become a weakness. Our lack and deficiencies could sometimes be needed and are therefore instrumental in our journey to be able to commune with others, and therefore render ourselves open to the wisdom that only our co-pilgrims could provide. 

THE HUMAN PERSON AND THE SOCIETY

On the Foundation of a Community: From Plato’s Crito and Republic (Books 1-2)

Crito and the Importance of the Law and Social Order

In his dialogue Crito, Plato portrays a Socrates who is in prison awaiting his death sentence. He was visited by his friend Crito who was anxious about the certainty of Socrates’ death. Crito arrived in the prison cell even wondering why Socrates was sleeping so calmly when his death was about to come. In contrast, it is Crito who is so anxious about the impending death of Socrates.

In the course of their conversation, Crito was trying to convince Socrates to leave prison. Crito assured Socrates of his (Crito) capacities to support and sustain Socrates’ exile. In the perspective of Crito, Socrates could better live the life of an outlaw as they work together to find a way to expose the truth and seek for justice (as they are convinced that Socrates’ trial and sentence are unjust). In fact, Crito argues that if Socrates really loves the young people of Athens then he has to live and fight as a real teacher. His death is his own abandonment of his work and mission. If Socrates would simply allow an unjust trial to bring about his death, then he simply gives up his mission and abandoned the young people under his care.

In response to Crito’s pleadings, Socrates gave a calm reply that is so characteristic of a person of reason. He told Crito that if he is indeed a teacher, then he needs to decide with care over the current situation. He is not to blur the distinction about what is right and wrong. He is supposed to discern the right and do the right at all times. In no way can the wrong be justified. Socrates argues that the laws and state have brought him, and his friends, into being and has cared for and nurtured them. The “social order” has in a sense made them the kind of people that they are. If he escapes prison, then he will abandon his fidelity to that order, and the consequences will be worse. In the conversation, Socrates allowed the Law to speak thus:

But he who has experience of the manner in which we order justice and administer the State, and still remains, has entered into an implied contract that he will do as we command him. And he who disobeys us is, as we maintain, thrice wrong: first, because in disobeying us he is disobeying his parents; secondly, because we are the authors of his education; thirdly, because he has made an agreement with us that he will duly obey our commands; and he neither obeys them nor convinces us that our commands are wrong; and we do not rudely impose them, but give him the alternative of obeying or convincing us; that is what we offer and he does neither.

Moreover, Socrates argues that he would not be abandoning his mission even if he dies. In fact, that is the natural consequence of his being a teacher. If he truly professes virtue and justice, then he is supposed to uphold justice at all times, even if it would have to mean his death. He has to be even willing to suffer injustice rather than to do justice. Socrates again has this for the Law to say:

Now you depart in innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil; a victim, not of the laws, but of men. But if you go forth, returning evil for evil, and injury for injury, breaking the covenants and agreements which you have made with us, and wronging those whom you ought least to wrong, that is to say, yourself, your friends, your country, and us, we shall be angry with you while you live, and our brethren, the laws in the world below, will receive you as an enemy; for they will know that you have done your best to destroy us.

The Crito has argued for the importance of the law and order of the State. In the classical times when Socrates lived, the social order was almost universally treated as paramount and more important, even over individual welfare and benefits. Hence, it is almost certain that a revered teacher like Socrates would argue for the upholding of the law above and over his own life.

The dialogue insists that law and order are the foundations of the community. Socrates even made a distinction between a well-governed state and Thessaly which he described to be a state of lawlessness. “Wellness” of the state then resides in the citizens’ capacity to properly discern and commit to do that which is right, and to ensure that the social order is preserved by just laws. This dialogue could perhaps be instructive of the way we live communities in the contemporary times. The context has changed significantly between our time and that of Socrates, but “unity” in the state remains to be relevant. The significant difference lies however in the kind of ‘unity’ that required “conformity” in the Athenian society of Socrates, and the ‘unity amidst plurality’ in the social contexts of our time.

Justice in Plato’s Republic: Justice as giving one’s contribution for the state

Plato’s Republic began with a search for a satisfactory definition of justice. Socrates argued that the prevailing definitions of justice are insufficient. He does not agree with the understanding of justice as returning that which was owed, for there are instances that we are not supposed to give back what we have received from others, like doing evil in return for an evil done unto us. Socrates will not agree with the dictum, ‘an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’ Moreover, Socrates does not also agree with those who said that justice is about “doing good for one’s friends, and doing harm to one’s enemies.” This has partly been refuted above in Crito when Socrates said that ‘we can never be justified in doing harm on others.’ Moreover, Socrates said that we can be mistaken about our understanding of the good of our friends, and we eventually end up doing those which really harm our friends rather than do them good. Lastly, Socrates could not also agree with Trasymachus’ definition of justice as doing the will of the strong. In fact, Socrates even believes that the foundation of our society lies on the fact that we are not self-sufficient, that is, on the fact that we all have our own vulnerabilities and inherent weaknesses that can be supplied by the strengths of others.

The Republic then proceeds to describe justice as ‘doing one’s contribution for the state.’ Plato compares the organic function of the body, where all parts contribute to its proper functioning. In the same way, Plato argues that the needs of the state have to be supplied by its members. Hence, the greater the need of the state, the larger the state has to become. In Plato’s conception of the state, each of the members has to discern his/her special skills and make it his/her contribution for the state.

This is the reason why Plato would say that ‘weakness’ (cf. Bk. 2) is the foundation of the community. We come together and form a community because we are not self-sufficient. This is a thought that that has also been raised in Crito when Socrates offers an argument for the importance of the law and social order where he had the law speak about the contributions of the state in the well-being of every individual like Socrates and Crito.

In the Republic, Plato mentions that the survival of the state is assured by the coming together of people who perform their own respective role for the state: the bakers, farmers, blacksmith, soldiers, philosophers, artisans and others. It is important for Plato that all these agents in the community are doing their part because no one among us can possibly provide for all those things that we need each day. Hence, he speaks about the insufficiency of each individual as an important reason for the creation of the state. We come together and create the state because we need each other to provide those things which we cannot provide for ourselves.

With this, Plato (through Socrates) argues that it is always better to do justice rather than injustice. His critics are pessimistic on the thought that a particular person will unconditionally do justice rather than injustice for it seems that people simply want to “appear” just  and not really ‘to be’ just. We all wanted, it seems, to appear just because of the social rewards which we get in appearing as just and in the accompanying punishment that injustice begets. His critics recall the ring of Gyges, which provides the power to make somebody invisible, and argue that it would look more practical for most people to use the ring not only to “appear just,” – that is, they will make themselves visible when they perform justice; but will also use the ring to hide their commission of injustice – that is, they will make themselves invisible when they commit injustice that will enrich them personally. Hence, so they argue, it seems that the more ideal state is: “to do injustice but to appear just,” and the worst state is “when we suffer injustice and continues to appear unjust (and thereby punished).”

Countering the above claim, Plato explains that any act of injustice, even if it is hidden from the public eye, will compromise the order of the state. Such compromise will affect all the members of the state. When we destroy the social order (the just way of relating with others understood as doing that which is expected of us for the preservation and enrichment of the social order) through the non-performance of our roles in the polis, we contribute to the state’s downfall which also includes our own. Hence, for Plato, the mere appearance of justice will not really help the individual. It is only when the individual is truly just that he works for the good of the whole, which also means the betterment of his/her own self.

Moreover, it is worth noting that Plato’s definition of justice is about the ‘performance’ of our roles; it is about the realization of our functions and responsibilities inside the state. Justice, in the Platonic sense, is about our own contribution. It is about doing what each individual can do[1] in order to contribute for the flourishing of the state which will also be instrumental to the flourishing to the lives of individuals.

Society: A Network of Giving and Receiving

Contractual theory of a society: The Society as a regulator of the Freedom of its citizens

The coming of modernity has changed the social landscape of most communities. It was Thomas Hobbes who thematically outlined the nature of the human person as a self-interested being. He argues that the human person, in the state of nature, is absolutely free. Moreover, the human person is self-interested. He pursues that which is good for the self, for it is this self-interestedness that assures the human person his/her survival. Self-interest then is the primary motivator of the actions of the human person.

Yet, Thomas Hobbes also acknowledges that the human person, in his/her state of nature, is also naturally doomed towards a war with another person. He would say that “the human person is a wolf to another human person,” that is, human persons are in a constant war among themselves.  Each person’s freedom may become an obstacle to the pursuit of the other, and the conflict could escalate into wars. Wars then are mismanaged conflict that were unaddressed, or were at least insufficiently addressed.

The role of the State then is to provide a venue for compromise. In a state, every free individual enters into a contract that allows him/her to give up particular expression of his/her freedom with the reciprocal expectation that s/he will enjoy a degree of security. Locke argues that freedom can only guaranteed by recognition of certain constraints. Without a sufficient respect and recognition of constraints, freedom and well-being are hardly guaranteed. 

The role of the government (which Hobbes calls as the Leviathan) then is simply to manage our conflicts in order to avoid the wars. Though Hobbes and Locke vary in their understanding of the tasks of a government, they are in an agreement about the government’s minimal role of regulating the freedom of its citizens so that they could avoid the eventuality of wars. In this contractarian understanding of the state is not concerned with the pursuit of the individual’s well-being. Pursuing individual goods is the work of the individual and not of the state.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau furthers the reflections of Hobbes and Locke, and looks at the human person in his state of nature as a being who is both innocent and stupid. Rousseau believes that the human person is by nature good, that is, s/he pursues his/her own goods, and is not governed by any external standards of right and wrong. However, the human person in the state of nature is also stupid, and it is only in his/her association with others that s/he can educate himself/herself. Hence, the human person has to enter into associations (like the family) in order to be educated.

Sadly however, the society has the tendency to corrupt the individual. Rousseau argues that the innocence of the individual may be corrupted by the state as it is in the state where the individual may start to develop his/her envy as s/he begins to compare the self with others. Rousseau warns that we have to be careful about our human relations within a state for, as Hobbes already warned, we can be potential aggressors against one another. Contrary to Hobbes however, Rousseau teaches that in the state’s regulation of the individual freedom, justice is assured if we look into the natural rights of individual. The role of the state then is to ensure that the rights of individuals are tightly guarded against abuses. Hence, laws are to be enshrined in order to become arbiters on issues. Rousseau wants to do away with personal governments for he is convinced that personal governments could lead to some abuses. Rather, the impersonal law that has to be formulated via what he calls the general will shall become the basis for our action. Once a law, it shall command obedience even from among free citizens.

However, in the same way as Hobbes’ government is not concerned with redistributing the goods of the state to ensure justice among the members, Rousseau’s view continues to be minimalist. Though it is concerned with the good of all, it is rather ambiguous with regard to individual and even state’s responsibilities to take care of the needs of the state’s members. Instead, there is a tendency to look at the society in a rather divisive way for such theory simply looks at the other members of the community as potential offender, rather than defender, of my rights.

In a modern contractarian understanding of the society then, the pre-modern conception that emphasizes the need to create the society or a political community in order to achieve a certain degree of sufficiency – which could impossibly be achieved by an individual and is not fully addressed by the domestic community - no longer provides the paradigmatic understanding of what a society should be. Modernity’s emphasis on the capacities of the individual person veers away from the talk about our insufficiencies and vulnerabilities. Instead, modernity has divinized the capacities of the individual and argues that the individual could survive on his/her own. Entering the society then is not consequential to the nature of the human person. It is instead an anti-dote to the by-product of man’s natural state: a natural consequence towards war with others. The society, in modern contractual conceptions, is needed to ensure merely that we do not hurt one another’s life and possessions. But, it also contributes to the increasing prejudice against the talk of one’s inherent responsibilities to become brother’s keeper for one’s neighbor.

Society as a network of giving and receiving

It is modernity’s decreasing appreciation of the language of mutuality, common good and responsibility for the other that challenges contemporary moral and social philosophers, especially those within the social teaching tradition of the Church, to launch a critique to the dominant moral doctrine of contemporary societies. Most of the critics of the dominant liberal tradition proposed to revisit the Thomistic-Aristotelian tradition which holds that the human person is also a social being: the human person is necessarily related to another human person. Following Aristotle, Aquinas claims that there are two basic reasons why a human person needs a community:

a.      Man needs others for survival: No one could have survived without the help of another human person. Our family is our first human society, and we owe our survival from the people who first took care of us when we were yet unable to care for ourselves.

b.      Man needs others for well-being: No one is self-sufficient, and no one could fully provide all his/her needs. This should be a reason for us to treat others with respect because the “other” is a potential ally/helper in any of our human activity.

For Aristotle and Aquinas, the society is important because it serves as a venue for mutual help. Coming together in a society, it becomes possible for us to exchange our goods and skills in order to fill the inherent lack and limitation of each one. In other words, the community is the filler for the limitation of individuals.

Followers of Aquinas could agree with Hobbes who said that the primary motivator of the human person into action is self-interest. We do things because we are interested in them. However, we do not simply start with interests. Our realization about our insufficiency (as Plato said it) allows us to see our needs for others, and so, we enter into a community. At the foundation of our community then is our inherent insufficiency and vulnerability, which also consequently points to the necessity that we work together.

Hence, the reason for common life is not just the preservation of our own lives so that we could ably pursue our interests, but rather also in discerning the best ways where we could contribute and make such contribution for the state. It is true that I am pursuing my own interests in the state, but I am at the same time aware that my personal interests do not necessarily conflict with the common good, and in fact, in those cases when my personal interest conflicts with the common good, it may even be for my better benefit if I would have to give up parts of my freedom in this case and uphold the common good.

The Human Individual: Maturity of moral reasoning and the notion of the Common Good

An important contribution of this debate between these conceptions about the human community is the emerging discussion on how are we to understand ourselves as human individual. As individuals, we are guided in our human actions via our understanding of what is the human good for us.  That which we see as good is the one that becomes the end or the purpose of our human actions.

It is the understanding of the human good, and the importance of such conception in justifying a certain conception of justice, that allows modern philosophers to argue against its pre-modern precursors for the priority of one’s interests and rights. Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau are certainly correct in pointing out a possible excess or abuse in the ancient conception of justice that almost ignores the individual’s conception of what is good for him/her in favor of that which is beneficial for the community – justifying such conception of course with the excuse that such will be ultimately beneficial for the individuals concerned. Modern philosophers however have pointed out that we could only hypocritically push for the welfare of the individual if we will not recognize that individual’s capacity to define what is really good for him/her. Authentic concern for the individual’s well-being will mean that we allow that individual to define the human good for himself or herself.

On the other hand, modernity seems to have spawned the excessive zeal on the individual’s right to define the human good for himself or herself. With modernity, anomie (where the individual views oneself as totally free from any connection or responsibility towards others) has also emerged. Modernity’s individualist conception of the human good has also contributed to the waning appreciation of the social nature of the human person.

We are then reminded that the human person is both an individual (hence accorded with a capacity to define that which is good for him or her) and social (the human person is not, and could not be, an isolated being). The human person, while given the capacity to pursue his/her own flourishing, could not ignore his/her membership in a community, and such membership is part and parcel of who s/he is as a human person. In the definition then of what is good for me as an individual human person, I could not also totally free myself from the fact that I am also a member of a community and is thereby accorded with some responsibilities which flow from my roles. Hence, when I make decisions as a person, I of course decide on what is best for me as a concrete human person – Joel Sagut – but I could not ignore the fact that part of such a decision is my role as a teacher, as an employee, as a son, as a brother, as a husband and as a father. Some of these roles may become a source of a dilemma in certain situations – as when the demand of work will sometimes conflict with the need to be present in the school affair of my child – but, it remains true that when I make decisions, I do not just make it as an anomic individual but as a social being.

There is then an important reminder about the development of our human capacities to reason out, and our capacity to mature as a moral agent. We are first called – as the modern philosophers will argue – to make decisions for ourselves, and yet we are also reminded that making decisions require a certain degree of maturity in our reasoning. An uninformed mind could not make a good decision – this is the reason why we do not call it freedom when we let a four year old child cross a highway; it’s abusive, rather than respectful of the child’s freedom, to do this.

This is an important point that Heidegger and MacIntyre have both reminded us. Heidegger has reminded us that we are a Dasein – by being a Dasein, we are a cut above the rest. Our being a Dasein makes us different from animals which lack the capacity to recollect and to think for themselves that which is really good for them. A hungry mouse would not have second thoughts about eating a piece of cheese on top of the table – regardless if the cheese is poisoned or not; human persons are expected to behave differently. Human persons are expected to raise questions about the actions that they are about to do. It is in this sense that our capacity to make decisions is called to improve. We are all entitled to make decisions – and so we must exercise that capacity to really discern for that which is really good for us.[2]

Moreover, Heidegger reminds us that we are being-thrown-into-the-world. There are several aspects in our lives that are beyond our choices. This means that the world we are in will always influence the kind of decisions that we make. This then reminds us that when we make decisions, we could not ignore the concerns that confront us in the here and the now. We always make our decisions in context. Nevertheless, Heidegger reminds us that our freedom allows us to go beyond our context. Yes, we decide according to our contexts, but we are never determined by our contexts. A poor student for example makes decision according to the limited resources that s/he has. S/he knows that his/her decisions to go to school could be limited, but such limitation will not prohibit him/her from entering quality schools. Having been made aware of the limited resources, s/he, for example, would have to make sure to grab and work for any possible opportunity to enter a quality school for College. Such decision allows him/her to make the kind of decisions that she takes. So, when she decides to spend much of her time for her studies instead of going with friends to a mall, she manifests a degree of maturity in her understanding of her own context. Heidegger then reminds us of this important component – a good degree of sensibility towards who we are, where we are, what we have, what we would want to achieve – that will allow us to decide more appropriately. It calls us to mature as a moral agent in order to make the proper decisions that we are supposed to make.

Lastly, Alasdair MacIntyre, offers another important reminder about cultivating our minds in order to make good decision about what is good for us. MacIntyre, affirming what Heidegger has said about Dasein’s capacity to define the human good for himself/herself, and the need to decide in context, also reminds us that as we mature in what he terms as independent practical reasoning, that is, making your own decision about what to do in the here and the now, it is important to be mindful that our interests and desires are also at the same time formed. One fundamental responsibility of the moral agent is the kind of exposure and formation that we provide for ourselves in order to begin appreciating the things that we appreciate as good. Hence, MacIntyre calls for a degree of custody over our senses and our mind, and to orient ourselves with our responsibilities not just as an individual but also as a social being. Hence, MacIntyre reminds us of the importance of the concept of the common good in the development of our independent practical reasoning – reminding us once again that we can be vulnerable anytime and that the way we appreciate that which is good need not be purely self-directed but should also be directed towards the common good.

Following Heidegger and MacIntyre then, we are reminded to really make good decisions for ourselves, and it would be unjust against us to be deprived of the capacity to make that decision for ourselves. However, we too are reminded that our minds and desires are formed by every exposure, every little action, every minute decision that we make. As we mature in our capacity to decide for the things that we think to be good for us, we are reminded to resist the temptation of a self-directedness that compromise our social nature as a human person.

On the Human Person as a Free Individual[3]

One important component of the human person, especially if that human person is to live inside a community, is the expression of his/her personal freedom and individuality. How shall an individual human person function within a community? Hobbes and Rousseau have already pointed out that though the human person is free (absolutely free in fact), s/he would have to negotiate that freedom as soon as s/he enters into a community. Hence, it would also be worthwhile to look into that freedom.

Martin Heidegger believes that the beginning of human wisdom is in the realization that the human person, which he calls as the Dasein, has two important realities: s/he is a being-in-the-world and a being-towards-death. Being-in-the-world has several implications:

1. Every human person has a world: No one lives in a vacuum. Rather, every human person has an immediate environment, and such environment affects the thoughts and choices of the person. This means that every human person lives in a context, and such context is always unique. Heidegger says that my world is purely mine. This explains why every human person, no matter how proximate his/her environment with that of another, maintain his/her uniqueness. No two individuals are totally alike because no two individuals have exactly the same world.[4]

2. In that world, there are other entities, which he divided into Dasein and mere entities. All other things in the world (including animals) present themselves to the human person as a ready-to-hand. We relate to the world via the world’s practical significance in our life, that is, the world’s usability. The entities of this world can serve as tools. But, there are also other Daseins in the world, and they refuse our tendency to use. Other Daseins resists any attempt of manipulation, and so they have to be treated as another free and autonomous individual. We respect other Daseins in the same way as we want ourselves to be treated. We need to practice intersubjectivity, that is, every other Dasein is a being endowed with his/her own freedom. This means that every Dasein is free to express his opinion, to resist our control and manipulation. This means that we would need to deal with every Dasein singularly: only authentic dialogue can allow us to become a Being-with-Others.

3. We are all THROWN-into-the-world. This means that there are many aspects in our human existence that are beyond our choice. We do not choose our nationality, our age, our race, and even our surnames. More importantly, most of these things largely affect the kind of existence that we live. Hence, Martin Heidegger says that we are thrown to particular situations, which in most parts are not really product of our choices and actions. Martin Heidegger refers to this as the destining of Being. Being leads us to where we are now, and our thrown-ness highlights the limitations of our human freedom.

But, our being thrown into the world is precisely the basis for Martin Heidegger’s concept of human freedom. If human persons are thrown, which means that there are many aspects in our personal lives that are not really product of our choices and actions, does this mean that we are less free? For Martin Heidegger, our being thrown does not in any way diminish our freedom. Our thrownness is part of our nature: that is who we are. However, we remain to be free despite having been thrown. For Martin Heidegger, our thrownness is the basis for our freedom. Our choices are always colored by our context, by our world. No other person could impose his/her decision on what I should do because I have my own context. I am singularly thrown. However, I need TO DEAL with my present world. He describes the condition of man as a BEING-THROWN INTO THE WORLD…

For Martin Heidegger, freedom is transcendence. We need to outgrow the present context where we are in. Human life is but a continuous attempt to transcend our present situation. A man who lazily refuses to transcend his present condition also loses his sense of meaning in life. Being free means that I should be able to TRANSCEND my current situation. Freedom means a constant attempt to push and extend my boundaries. This is the reason why human growth and freedom go hand in hand. Only free individuals are able to grow because they are the ones who are not afraid to push their current limits.

True freedom means brings courage and bravery. A truly free individual is not afraid to try new things. Certainly, new things are fearsome. New things bring uncertainties. It forces us to face new horizons. In fact, NEW THINGS ARE MONSTROUS and monsters are frightening because of their novelty. Any monster that has become familiar ceases to become a monster but may even eventually become a friend. For Martin Heidegger, though new things are oftentimes frightening, we need to embrace and welcome them into our lives. It is in trying new things that we grow as an individual. New challenges and new responsibilities are opportunities to become a better person, they are occasions for us to become free. This means then that a truly free individual is one who leaves his/her comfort zone and attempts new things in his/her life. It is in being free this way that we become better individuals.

Moreover, a being-towards-death means that the human person has a limited existence. This life has an end. The realization of an end reminds us to “care.” Finitude oftentimes, it ‘must’ in fact, leads us to appreciation. Realizing that this life is a finite one, that it has an end, allows us to appreciate the need to make plans for this life. We need to plan for our life in order to make sense for it. We need to create and design priorities, for we know that we can never do “all” things in this life.

Martin Heidegger is reminding us then that as a free individual, we are limited beings. Freedom is a capacity to make sense to the finite existence that we have, with due consideration and attention to our thrownness, to our givens, to our contexts.

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[1] Alasdair MacIntyre, in his Dependent Rational Animals, has pointed out that even the weakest members of the society could “help” us learn more about ourselves. In that sense, even the weak contribute to the betterment of the state. Hence, it is sad when we deprive them to perform that role by simply disregarding them.

[2] It is important to emphasize this because there are many people, especially young people who surrender this capacity on behalf of what they see, hear and watch in the popular media. We are oftentimes tempted to allow the wider culture to define for us that which is really good. Peer pressure in school setting for example is an important component of this. Pressure exercised by what we see in the social media is another. We are always tempted to see the popular culture as definitive of what is good or bad. It is to counter this tendency that Heidegger invites us to become authentic Daseins.

SEARCHING FOR THE THEOLOGICAL CONSTANTS: A PROPOSED METHOD FOR A POST-HEIDEGGERIAN DECONSTRUCTION OF ONTO-THEOLOGICAL RELIGIOUS THINKING

Philosophy as Metaphysics
The early writings of Martin Heidegger showed certain fondness for the early Greek thinkers. In fact, in his book Parmenides, he praised Parmenides as a thinker who has hinted the aletheia of Being. With the early Greek thinkers, Being is a physis, a coming-to-be, or an unfolding. Being lies in the truth’s unfolding of itself. Hence, Being is perceived more as a dynamic act of disclosure rather than a static presence.

One recent experience has shown me what this aletheia is all about. My wife and I visited Singapore because of a friend’s invitation to take a three-day vacation. My three days in the country was an experience of aletheia. Each day, I come to encounter a new thing about Singapore, and such new experience is the country’s new disclosure to my consciousness. My ideas about this city has slowly been incarnated because of these new experiences. My experience of the effeciency of their transport system – from their trains, their buses, and cabs; of their HDB units or housing; their right hand drive vehicles; their chicken rice and chili crab menus; their clean streets; and even the harmonious blending of their races – Chinese, Malay, Indians and Bangladeshi. All these contributed to what I now know about Singapore. Aletheia are these new encounters that reveal the truth more and more. It certainly is not an exhaustive grasp of the truth of the city, but it allows me to know the city more, that is, in a way richer than my previous knowledge of it.

This was the aletheia of Being which the early thinkers have labored to articulate. It refers to the gradual unfolding of things. But, in the history of the philosophy of the West, such Being has been slowly replaced by an ontic being especially with the philosophy of Plato. Plato introduces the first metaphysics and the rest of the history of the West followed him.[1] Since Plato, philosophy becomes metaphysics. Being is no longer the process of coming to be, rather it was reduced to a complete static presence. Being becomes that which is common to all beings, hence Plato calls it as the Beingness of beings or what is later known as the essence.

The entire philosophical tradition becomes an attempt to name Being as the essence, even if essence has been substituted by many other names like Idea, Substance, God, or the Spirit. Every era in the history of the West has become an attempt to give a complete narrative about the Being of beings.

Metaphysics as Onto-Theological

Furthermore, Heidegger contends that metaphysics is necessarily onto-theological. Philosophy as onto-theology searches for the ground of being which is perceived as the source or the creator. Hence, philosophy has become a science of both God - as the creator of beings, and of the Being of beings or that principle which is common to all things.[2] The God of onto-theology is just another objective reality that grounds the existence of all other things. It is completely “present” just like any other being even if it is the first or the best in the gradation of things. Furthermore, the Being of beings is the essence of things. As Plato would say, the meaning of a table is the Idea of table or tableness, outside the tableness of the table, that table cannot be.

With this, Being was reduced to being, which leads philosophy to abandon its original vocation to think. Philosophy ceases to become attentive to the unfolding of Being. Rather, it becomes a mere empirical science. It seeks to grasp the essence of things in order simply to manipulate and control them. This onto-theological character of philosophy as metaphysics is in fact the necessary predecessor of the control freak mathematico-scientific thinking[3], which in turn results to the many disasters of our modern time because of its incapacity to transcend the mere physicality of things. With this, there is a need for what he calls as “the task of destroying the history of ontology.”[4]

Overcoming Metaphysics and the Call for a New Way of Thinking
Heidegger further argues that metaphysics favors calculative thinking over the reflective thinking of an authentic philosophy. He then calls for the destruction of metaphysics, which is not an absolute abandonment but a step-back. This is a retreat from calculative temperament in order to recapture the reflective thought. Philosophy needs to step-back to its original vocation to reflect on the disclosure of Being rather than on being. Whereas being is objectified in metaphysics, in the step-back, Being becomes a no-thing. Since it is not a thing whose existence is complete and objectified, Being always left something unsaid and hidden. Being would always have a reserve.[5]

The task of this new way of thinking then is to uncover the hiddenness of Being. There is always something that can be said and discovered because in every utterance there would always also be the concealment of Being. Philosophy then necessarily becomes reflective. It becomes a patient paying attention to Being’s simultaneous unfolding and concealment. It awaits and is awed by Being’s every disclosure because such would always be fresh and new. At the same time, philosophy is also aware that every temporal revelation is incomplete. There always remains something hidden, and such would always be an invitation for further reflection.

The Whither of Religous Thinking

If philosophy needs to overcome metaphysics in order to escape its onto-theological tendencies, how about theology? What then would happen to theology after Heidegger’s criticism against onto-theology?

Max Myer clarified that after Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics[6] and the poststructuralist thinkers who followed him, theology or religious thinking could no longer remain as what it was throughout centuries. The foundationalist theology of Scholasticism that is anchored on presence could no longer continue to ignore the hiddenness of Being. Religious thinking has also to confront the fact that it has to give account for the absence of Being.

In this sense, even theology is not just about faithful handing down of revealed truths. It is also a relevant utterance of the Gospel. Theology is not just about repetitious professions of the doctrine of the Fathers. Rather, it is also about articulating the Gospel in a way that is meaningful to our context. The Fathers and all the rest of the generations following them have certainly articulated the Gospel in a way that is mindful of their respective culture and time. It would then be the role of our contemporary theologizing to articulate the Gospel in such a way that is both attentive to the temperament of the people especially the young and, at the same time, in a manner that is faithul to the Judaeo-Christian Tradition as has been initiated by the members of the first Christian communities. The question, however, is: how are we to do this?

The Search for the Theological Constants

Contemporary theologians have realized that to do contextual theology is now an imperative.[7] A well-acclaimed Filipino theologian, José de Mesa, once claimed: “Theology endeavors to express the Gospel faithfully and yet only does it contextually.”[8] The real test of contextual theologizing rests on its method. This even allows Stephen Bevans to distinguish six models of contextual theology, the classifications of which are mostly based on a particular reflection’s method which gives emphasis on either of the two poles: a theology’s faithfulness to the Gospel or its rootedness to the culture of the people. Contemporary theologizing needs to strike a meaningful balance of these two emphases, that is, aiming to be significant to a particular culture while at the same maintaining its fidelity to the truth of the Gospel. Whereas it’s true that the culture plays a significant role in articulating the faith so much so that Paul VI argues that “evangelization loses much of its force and effectiveness if it does not take into consideration the actual people to whom it is addressed, if it does not use their language, their signs and symbols, if it does not answer the question they ask, and if it does not have an impact on their concrete life.” (E.N. 63)[9] It is equally important to note also that “Theology does not only have to square with the demands of meaning, but also of truth. Legitimate attention to relevance, after all, does not dispense with fidelity to the Tradition.”[10] This is where the notion of the theological constants may become an important contribution.

José de Mesa is among the first contemporary theologians who insisted on utilizing the theological constants.[11] In his mentioned article on the “Contextual Theological Reflection on Justice,” de Mesa emphasized the importance of exploring the various traditions of Catholic theological reflections and of discerning the areas whereby they converge. He calls these similarities as the theological contants.

These theological constants facilitate the work of contextualized theological reflections. They assure us of two things: a particular reflection’s fidelity to the Judeao-Christian Tradition, and its meaningfulness to the context of the people.

It is important to take note that these constants are not a priori principles. Rather, they are discovered. The constants are the various disclosures of Being in the various eras and contexts of theological reflections.

It is true that our conscioiusness is also shaped by our time and context, and the way we understand the movements of God may also be influenced by the kind of consciousness formed by our own context and time. Hence, we would be justified in distinguishing theologies like that of the Fathers, of the Scholastics, of African theologians, or that of a Latin American theology or a Filipino theology. If a theological articulation would have to be meaningful to the people, it should never ignore the context in which the theological articulation is done or addressed.

But while it is true that the context of theologians are varied, which is also the condition of the variety of theological articulations, we should not also ignore the fact that these articulations are all reflections of the ONE Gospel of Christ. Hence, they could not be totally different. They have to converge on certain things simply because they talk of an only single TRUTH, Christ Himself.

This is where the constants play an important role. Discovering the converging themes in the established theological traditions is an assurance that we are paying attention to the unfolding of God’s Being as it takes a meaningful form. The a posteriori approach is a testimony that we are not making arbitrary namings of God’s disclosure. The constants are the authentic experiences of the people. In a sense, the constants are God’s own way of dealing with the multipliciy of the people’s cultures and traditions. Hence, discovering them in a theological articulation is an assurance that such singular and particular tradition is also faithful to God’s revelation in the Gospel.

Using the Constants as Guides for Fresh Theological Articulations
Assuring a theology’s faithfulness to the Gospel is not the only function of the theological constants. They also serve as guides for fresh articulations.[12] For a theology to be relevant to the culture of the people, it has to assume the language of that culture. Hence, it has to take new formulations. In doing this, the constants can be used as guides. They would ensure that the new formulations are not totally severed from the Judaeo-Christian Tradition. With the constants, the new articulations are assured that they are still linked to the Gospel.

Hence, the constants open the possiblity for a fresh articulation of the Gospel. It allows the realization that there are new facets of the truth that is uniquely revealed to a particular culture. Although, theology could not ignore the elements of the culture because God’s Being is certrainly revealed in all culture, it is also aware at the same time that “in speaking about the faith, such elements are not totally adequate. There may be a need to qualify or at times even negate them in the light of the faith it speaks about.”[13] The constants then become helpful guides in evaluating which elements of the culture are faithful to the Gospel, and which elements would have to be taken out.

Understanding the Constants as Affirmation of the Hiddenness of Being

Among the important contributions of the use of the constants in theological articulations are the facts that they are discovered a posteriori and they are open to the fresh articulations of the Gospel. The use of the constants overcomes what Heidegger calls as onto-theology.

Heidegger even contends that when metaphysics takes the work of theology by assuming upon itself the question about God, as the first being or the uncaused cause, it does a “contradiction.” It is a “round-square” for it is certainly impossible to speak of God in the language of metaphysics.[14]

Such objection to theology, as equated to Christian Philosophy, is oftentimes used as testimonies for Heidegger’s alleged atheism. However, if we are to thoroughly examine Heidegger’s claim about religion and theological thinking, we might also be justified to say that Heidegger’s objection is not a total rejection of God. He was plainly criticizing the method or the language used in speaking about God.[15] He despises the onto-theological articulations of God, but his call for the god-less thinking, as an alternative to the onto-theological metaphysics of the West, may not be taken as a plain rejection of the Being of God. Heidegger himself clarifies his claim by saying, “the god-less thinking which must abandon the god of philosophy, god as causa sui, is thus perhaps closer to the divine God. Here this means only: the god-less thinking is more open to Him than the onto-theologic would like to admit.”[16]

Hence, it becomes our business now to discern as to what could this alternative (god-less, that is, free from the idols that we create of God) thinking which is perhaps closer to God Himself, which Heidegger is talking about. How are we to attain this kind of step-back from onto-theological thinking, that would afford us of an authentic theological reflection?

I propose here that a contextual theological reflection that uses the “theological constants” can be taken as a kind of a step back from the onto-theological character of the metaphysics of the West, which relies so much on the redundant articulations of the faith even if they are already devoid of meaning for the people.[17] The use of the theological constants allows the unfolding of what Myers would call as the reserve of Being. Using the theological constants as a guide for fresh articulations is a feasible means for a faithful reconstruction of the truth of the Gospel in a way that would be relevant to a particular culture. This reconstruction is a new articulation that is devoid of the instrumentality of the onto-theological thought, and is rather characterized by a patient waiting of the manifestations of Being. The use of the theological constants provides venues for authentic dialogue between the culture and the Gospel. This requires that the theologian takes the attitude of a patient listener who allows Being to speak, rather than that of manipulator who strategize things so that he could achieve his pre-conceived goal. The reconstructed articulation of a theology that utilizes the theological constants is one that allows an “opening to that which is held in reserve, the unsaid along with the said.”[18] Furthermore, “such an opening to the unsaid is incompatible with certainty and self-justification, since it is such an opening to that which cannot be projected as a possibility beforehand by the self.”[19]

This answers Heidegger’s critique against a pseudo-reflective religious thinking. Heidegger reminds us of the possible trap of an inauthentic theological thought which he refers to with the following words:

Anyone for whom the Bible is a Divine revelation and truth has the anwer to the question, “why are there essents rather than nothing?” even before it is asked: everything that is, except God himself, has been created by Him. God himself, the increate creator, “is.” One who holds to such faith can in a way participate in the asking of our question without ceasing to be a believer and taking all the consequences of the step. He will only be to act as if... On the one hand a faith that does not perpetually expose itself to the possibility of unfaith is no faith but mere convenience: the believer simply makes up his mind to adhere to the traditional doctrine. This is neither faith nor questioning, but the indifference of those who can busy themselves with everything, sometimes even displaying a keen interest in faith as well as questioning.[20]

This also allows Myers to claim that the future of religious thinking must gear towards the destruction of idols or “symbols which claims to be the center of a structure of meaning...”[21] He also argues further that religious thinking must also be wary of a reconstruction “which is only a repetition of the earlier event for it knows that time is the way that being reveals itself and that no one can step to that stream twice.”[22] For Myers, the post-Heideggerian religious thinking is destructive of both conventionalism and traditionalism “which longs for the eternal return of the same.”[23]

This certainly are the aims of the use of the theological constants. The approach is an explicit search for the various disclosures of Being. De Mesa claims that the use of the theological constants

...enable cross-historical and cross-cultural comparisons thereby serving as reminders as to which aspects of the faith (as represented by particular constants) need to be attended to in a new formulation by a local community. It may be well that a set of constants discovered in one local church may alert other local churches to certain aspects of the faith which they have not quite paid attention to but recognize as essential.[24]

The theological constants overcome the rigidity of fundamentalism and traditionalism upon which Heidegger frowns upon. These constants reorient theological thinking into the aletheic character of Being which reveals and conceals at the same time. As De Mesa again says,

After all, every contextualization of the Gospel tends to bring certain aspects of it to the foreground, while others are relegated to the background. This implies that the use of constants in gauging the truthfulness of a given theological reflection requires dialogue with other communities of faith, whether of the past or the present. Openness and willingness to learn is an imperative within this framework and procedure because constants are precisely discovered in a communally-oriented theologizing.[25]

The use of the constants provide us the means to confront the two-fold challenge of doing contextual theological reflection and of facilitating the step back to where Heidegger has invited us. The theological constants assure us that the a particular reflection remains faithful to the one Gospel of Christ as it is, at the same time, meaningful to the culture of the people. Furthermore, they also assure us that our theological articulations would always be open to the simulataneous disclosure and concealment of Being, the aletheic character of Being, which would ensure that every theological articulation is a further reflection about the truth of the Being of God.

Joel C. Sagut

[1] Martin Heidegger himself says in the End of Philosophy, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 4: “In the beginning of its history, Being opens itself out as emerging (physis) and unconcealment (aletheia). From there, it reaches the formulation of presence and permanence in the sense of enduring. Metaphysics proper begins with this.” Furthermore, Charles Guignon, in his “Introduction” for the Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 18, adds: “As a result to the first dawn of history, being comes to be thought of as what endures, what is permanent, what is always there. It is the continuous presence of the substance (ousia) that which remains through all changes... Because Plato inaugurated this interpretation of beingness, the entire history of metaphysics can be called ‘Platonism’.”
[2] Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 54: “western metaphysics, however, since its very beginning with the Greeks has eminently been both ontology and theology.”
[3] Max A. Myers. “Towards what is religious thinking underway?,” in Deconstruction and Theology. (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1982), 119.
[4] Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edwad Robinson. (Tubingen: Neomarius Verlag, 1963), 41.
[5]Myers, 138.
[6] Myers, 124.
[7] “There is no such thing as theology; there is only contextual theology... The contextualization of theology – the attempt to understand Christian faith in terms of a particular context – is really a theological imperative,” in Stephen Bevans, Models of Contextual Theology. (Manila: Logos Publications, Inc., 2003), 3.
[8] José de Mesa, “Contextual Theological Reflection on Justice,” Philippiniana Sacra, vol. XLIII, no. 127 (January-April, 2008), 5.
[9] Paul VI, Evangelii Nuntiandi. (Pasay City: Daughters of St. Paul, 1976), art. 26; Cf. de Mesa, 8.
[10] De Mesa, 9.
[11] De Mesa, 10-11. He however attributes the originality of the use of the concept of the “contants” to the following authors: James D.G. Dunn, Unity and Diversity in the New Testament: An Inquiry into the Character of Earliest Christianity (2nd ed., London: SCM Press, 1990, 11-32; Paul VI, Evangelii Nuntiandi (Pasay City: Daughters of St. Paul, 1976), art. 26; Edward Schillebeeckx , Interim Report on the Books “Jesus” & “Christ” (New York: Crossroad, 1981) 51-55; and Stephen Bevans and Roger P. Schroeder, Constants in Context: A Theology of Missions for Today (Maryknoll, New Yok: Orbis Books, 2004).
[12] De Mesa, 12.
[13] De Mesa, 11.
[14]Cf. Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (London: Yale University Press, 1959), 7, where he says: “Christian philosophy is a round square and a misunderstanding.”
[15]Heidegger’s objection against the god of onto-theology is rooted on his rejection of the philosophical notion of God as the highest Being and the uncaused cause, the causa sui. Hence, Heidegger says, “Man can neither pray nor sacrifice to this god. Beofre the causa sui, man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music and dance before this god.” Martin Heidegger (ID), 1969, 72.
[16] Heidegger (ID), 1969, 72.
[17] For examples of studies that utilizes the notion of theological contants in actual contextual theologizing, please see the following articles produced by the members of the theology research team of the John Paul II Research Center of UST: Arvin Eballo, “Theological Cosntants of Justice in the Old Testament,” Philippiniana Sacra, vol. XLIII, no. 127 (January – April 2008), 15-22; Jose de Mesa, “Theological Constants of Justice in the New Testament,” Philippiniana Sacra, vol. XLIII, no. 127 (January – April 2008), 23-32; Jannel Abogado, et. al., “Theological Constants in Tommaso d’Aquino’s Theology of Justice,” Philippiniana Sacra, vol. XLIII, no. 127 (January-April 2008), 33-66; and Dionisia Roman and Pablito Baybado, “Theological Constants of Justice in Catholic Social Teaching,” Philippiniana Sacra, vol. XLIII, no. 127 (January-April 2008), 83-98.
[18] Myers, 141.
[19] Myers, 141.
[20] Heidegger, 1959, 7.
[21] Myers, 142.
[22] Myers, 142.
[23] Myers, 142.
[24] De Mesa, 12-13.
[25] De Mesa, 13.

Jaspers' Possibilities for Contemporary Philosophizing

We have been made accustomed to think that truth is a rational truth that is, as the maxim that can be held as universal and can be accepted by all. However, there are also others who wish to entirely reject the truth of reason saying that ‘reason is the root of injustice and manipulation.’ Reason is being understood as the totalizing tendency to include everything into a unified understanding or perception. Reason has the drive to simplify everything and reduce its perception into a unified concept or system.

In my own understanding of Jaspers’ reflection about philosophy, I began to understand that philosophy for him can only be authentic if it addresses the actual existence of man. Hence, he calls it as Existenz philosophy.[1] He clarifies this Existenz philosophy saying: “in Existenz philosophy, out of the decisiveness of our fundamental bases, the clarity of a life related to Transcendence should again become communicable in thought, as a philosophizing with which we actually live.”[2]

Reflecting on these words, I think Jaspers tries to argue that philosophy can no longer be a single, complete system to be brought out as a presentation of concepts that represent the thought of great thinkers. Jaspers warns us against this tendency to create a system of philosophy. He believes that a system destroys philosophy. There can only be a philosophy of an individual person. A philosophy is a person’s articulation of a particular encounter with the world.[3] It is an attempt to name that which s/he discovers as s/he faces his/her own existence. This does not however mean that the truth is not shared or could not be a product of communication. Rather, Jaspers only says that we refrain from talking about concepts as if the concepts that we attach to a philosopher is his philosophy. Philosophy to be real should not be conceptual, and it should never be reduced to a system. In his autobiography he says, “Concepts which were originally reality pass through history as pieces of learning or information. What was once life becomes a pile of dead husks of concepts and these in turn become the subject of an objective history of philosophy.”[4] Jaspers believes that philosophy has to proceed in the manner that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche[5] developed their own. It has to be a product of one’s confrontation with his world, even painfully, rather than staying complacent with the already accepted sets of truths or concepts.[6] Real philosophy is born in the actual struggle through life, in seeing that in life, there are events that may not be defined and fully comprehended but still need to be articulated. It is in this encounter with life itself that we should do our philosophizing.

The tension between the rational and its opposite (the non-rational)

Jaspers has noted that the history of philosophy reveals the tension between the realm of the rational and that of its opposite, the non-rational. He cited as an example the highly rational articulation of the Greeks of Ancient philosophy who are also at the same time confronted by the irrationality of Fate. Jaspers said that this tension has gone further even until the time of Christianity where the desire to rationalize the faith through theology is also accompanied by faith’s assent to mystery. Christianity has articulated the irrational especially in the language of Providence whereby a Christian openly accepts that there are things that are beyond his capacity and understanding, but fall within the providence of God, and hence have to be accepted and obeyed.

In other words, in man’s tendency to rationalize the environment, the reality of the non-rational also emerges at the same time. “All philosophizing which would like to dissolve Being into pure rationality retains in spite of itself the non-rational.”[7] And further he says, “even in the most radical defiance of reason, there remains the minimum of rationality.”[8] The human person could never really escape his/her tendency to employ the use of reason as s/he confronts the world around him/her, as s/he wants to understand that which lies beyond him/her. Yet, at the same time also, it is a fact that the human person would also obviously fail to rationalize everything in his/her world. There would always be something that goes beyond ones comprehension.

The invitation of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche

In the history of philosophy, Jaspers noted, there are two thinkers (Kierkegaard and Nietzsche) who have endeavored to establish the balance of reason and the non-rational. Jaspers said that the emergence of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche was also accompanied by a particular turn in the reality of the Western man: “a destruction of all authority, a radical disillusionment in an overconfident reason.”[9] Hence, one striking character of the two is their doubt towards the so-called scientific men (the experts). Jaspers noted that “both suspect truth in the form of scientific knowledge.”[10] The experts have the tendency to believe that everything in the world can be explained, and can be subjected to experiments and scientific investigation. The experts hold that the world is comprehensible. But Jaspers lament over the experts’ incapacity to experience the “maturity of that critical point where everything turns upside down.”[11] What the experts, ironically, fail to understand is the fact that there are things that escape man’s absolute comprehension.

However, despite their critique against reason, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are not also abrogating reason altogether. They too agree that to perceive Being happens only through interpretation and so Being comes to man also only through reason. But such interpretation cannot be total. It cannot be so comprehensive as if it can speak the entirety of Being. Whereas they believe that reason interprets the existence of man, they also posit that interpretation is continuous and even endless.[12] For Jaspers then, man confronts his existence and articulates it through his use of reason. But the human person has to be made aware that the interpretation, even if it seems to be decisive, is but temporary and it can change anytime. With the finite nature of every interpretation, the philosopher is cautioned to be incessantly vigilant of his own existence because he knows that his articulation of it continues through time.[13]

The Need to Interpret through the exception

Jaspers has noted that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are not really the exemplars of their time. They are even sometimes ignored by their contemporaries. They too have not left a particular school of thought or a particular philosophical system. But they are studied even long after their death. They continue to haunt the minds even of the contemporary men. For Jaspers, these two, though they are the exceptions of their era because they dared to think differently, can serve as our inspirations in the way we do philosophy today.[14]

Philosophy has to cease from being a mere naming of concepts (from mere handing on or passing down of a philosopher’s doctrine (content) from one generation to the next). Philosophy has to transform into a real reflection (interpretation) of existence. A philosopher has to become constantly attentive to what he calls as the ciphers, as those which can point to the human person the possibilities for his/her future. The task of the philosopher is to confront the Encompassing, the Infinite possibilities, to which s/he could project herself/himself, and to begin a journey towards transcendence. With this kind of philosophizing, we must not forget to discern and decide for our purpose, for our direction, for our reasons. In journeying towards the unknown future, we must continue to ask: what else could come from here? Where would I like to proceed? What would I like to do? For us to become authentic philosophers, we have to constantly push ourselves in order to make decisions that can bring us beyond our boundaries. To philosophize is to journey toward the beyond, toward our Existenz.

Jaspers describes his lecture on Reason and Existenz as follows: “this lecture has no intention of surveying the whole, but rather of making the present situation perceptible by reflecting upon the past. No one knows where man and his thinking are going. Since existence, man, and his world are not at an end, a completed philosophy is as little possible as an anticipation of the whole.” He further says, “the contemporary problem is not to be deduced from some a priori whole; rather it is to be brought to consciousness out of a basis which is now experienced and out of a content still unclearly willed.” (48)

In short, when Jaspers reflected about the possibilities of the contemporary way of doing philosophy, he was insistent on the philosopher’s attentiveness to his present. The present is where man lives and creates his life. This is the non-rational part of philosophy: to be engaged, as it were, in what is happening at present. It is part of philosophizing to feel the agony of those who suffer, to rejoice with those who are in triumph, to fight the cause of the oppressed, to seek for justice for those who are marginalized, to experience the beauty of art and music, and I think, even to practice the faith of a believer. One has to be fully conscious of his present, of his situation, of his context.

However, Jaspers also realized that those who are so emphatic about the present also missed an important aspect of philosophizing. He admits that every mode of philosophizing could not totally dispense the use of reason. The present is so varied and enigmatic. Part of philosophizing is to create a whole, a unity, out of the multiplicity of the present. This is where reason plays its role. Reason however should not be conceived as mere objective thinking.[15] Reason is one’s grasp of beings that bring out the latter’s existential significance. It is that which pushes the variety and multiplicity of Existenz towards a kind of unity, even if such unity can never really be achieved.[16]

Jaspers believes that philosophy has to be rooted in the selfhood of the human person. The philosopher perceives Being as the Encompassing, which is a horizon of infinite possibilities. When Jaspers was said to contend that philosophy is “primarily an activity in which people gain illumination into the nature of their existence and that content and doctrines are relatively unimportant,”[17] he probably means that philosophizing is simply an articulation of humankind’s journey towards freedom and authenticity. The future of mankind surely depends on the kind of interpretation that we give to the ciphers of the encompassing. Our future depends on the decisions that we presently assume as part of our own journey toward our Existenz.
[1] Reason and Existenz, 128
[2]Reason and Existenz, 128.
[3] Jaspers said, “philosophical activity is fully real only at the summits of personal philosophizing… objectivized philosophical thought is a preparation for, and a recollection of, it.” http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/jaspers.htm. Retrieved last December 16, 2007.
[4] http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/jaspers.htm
[5] “Their (Kierkegaard’s and Nietzsche’s) earnestness and absoluteness overpower us as standards although we do not follow them in their content. That we owe something new to Kierkegaard and Nietzche – the possibility of laying the deepest foundations – and yet that we do not follow them in their essential decisions, makes up the difficulty of our philosophical situation.” (Reason and Existenz, 129 – parenthetical notes added).
[6] Jaspers himself said, “It is as though we again sought on these paths of philosophizing the quietude of Kant and Spinoza, of Nicolas of Cusa and Parmenides, turning away from the ultimate unrest of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. But still these latter philosophers remain as lighthouses still burning, perpetual indicators of directions, without which we would relapse into the deception of supposing there were teachable philosophic doctrine or contents, which as such are without power.” (Reason and Existenz, 130).
[7] Reason and Existenz, 20.
[8] Reason and Existenz, 20.
[9] Reason and Existenz, 23.
[10] Reason and Existenz, 25.
[11] Reason and Existenz, 26.
[12] Jaspers said, “The age of reflection has, since Fichte, been characterized as reasoning without restraint, as the dissolving of all authority, as the surrender of content which gives to thinking its measure, purpose and meaning, so that from now on, without hindrance and as an indifferent play of the intellect, it can fill the world with noise and dust… reflection cannot exhaust or stop itself. It is faithless since it hinders every decision.” (Reason and Existenz, 31).
[13] “Philosophy as thought is always a consciousness of Being which is complete for this moment, but which knows it has no final permanence in its form of expression.” (Reason and Existenz, 48).
[14] Jaspers said, “through them, we have become aware that for us there is no longer any self-evident foundation. There is no longer any secure background for our thought.”(Reason and Existenz, 46).
[15] John K. Roth, ed., World Philosophers and their Works. (California: Salem Press, Inc., 2000), 950.
[16] Roth 2000: 951.
[17] Roth 2000: 945.