On the
Foundation of a Community: From Plato’s Crito and Republic (Books 1-2)
Crito and the
Importance of the Law and Social Order
In his dialogue Crito, Plato portrays a Socrates who is in prison awaiting his
death sentence. He was visited by his friend Crito who was anxious about the certainty
of Socrates’ death. Crito arrived in the prison cell even wondering why
Socrates was sleeping so calmly when his death was about to come. In contrast,
it is Crito who is so anxious about the impending death of Socrates.
In the course of their conversation, Crito
was trying to convince Socrates to leave prison. Crito assured Socrates of his
(Crito) capacities to support and sustain Socrates’ exile. In the perspective
of Crito, Socrates could better live the life of an outlaw as they work
together to find a way to expose the truth and seek for justice (as they are
convinced that Socrates’ trial and sentence are unjust). In fact, Crito argues
that if Socrates really loves the young people of Athens
In response to Crito’s pleadings, Socrates
gave a calm reply that is so characteristic of a person of reason. He told
Crito that if he is indeed a teacher, then he needs to decide with care over
the current situation. He is not to blur the distinction about what is right
and wrong. He is supposed to discern the right and do the right at all times.
In no way can the wrong be justified. Socrates argues that the laws and state
have brought him, and his friends, into being and has cared for and nurtured
them. The “social order” has in a sense made them the kind of people that they
are. If he escapes prison, then he will abandon his fidelity to that order, and
the consequences will be worse. In the conversation, Socrates allowed the Law
to speak thus:
But he
who has experience of the manner in which we order justice and
administer the State, and still remains, has entered into an implied contract that he will do as we command him. And he who disobeys us
is, as we maintain, thrice wrong: first, because in disobeying
us he is disobeying his parents; secondly, because we are the
authors of his education; thirdly, because he has made an
agreement with us that he will duly obey our commands; and he
neither obeys them nor convinces us that our commands are wrong; and
we do not rudely impose them, but give him the alternative of obeying or convincing us; that is what we offer and he does neither.
Moreover, Socrates argues that he would not
be abandoning his mission even if he dies. In fact, that is the natural
consequence of his being a teacher. If he truly professes virtue and justice,
then he is supposed to uphold justice at all times, even if it would have to
mean his death. He has to be even willing to suffer injustice rather than to do
justice. Socrates again has this for the Law to say:
Now you depart in innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil; a victim, not of the
laws, but of men. But if you go forth, returning evil for evil,
and injury for injury, breaking the covenants and agreements
which you have made with us, and wronging those whom you ought
least to wrong, that is to say, yourself, your friends, your
country, and us, we shall be angry with you while you live, and
our brethren, the laws in the world below, will receive you as an
enemy; for they will know that you have done your best to destroy us.
The Crito
has argued for the importance of the law
and order of the State. In the
classical times when Socrates lived, the social order was almost universally
treated as paramount and more important, even over individual welfare and
benefits. Hence, it is almost certain that a revered teacher like Socrates
would argue for the upholding of the law above and over his own life.
The dialogue insists that law and order are
the foundations of the community. Socrates even made a distinction between a
well-governed state and Thessaly which he described to be a state of
lawlessness. “Wellness” of the state then resides in the citizens’ capacity to
properly discern and commit to do that which is right, and to ensure that the
social order is preserved by just laws. This dialogue could perhaps be
instructive of the way we live communities in the contemporary times. The
context has changed significantly between our time and that of Socrates, but
“unity” in the state remains to be relevant. The significant difference lies
however in the kind of ‘unity’ that required “conformity” in the Athenian
society of Socrates, and the ‘unity amidst plurality’ in the social contexts of
our time.
Justice in Plato’s
Republic: Justice as giving one’s contribution for the state
Plato’s Republic
began with a search for a satisfactory definition of justice. Socrates
argued that the prevailing definitions of justice are insufficient. He does not
agree with the understanding of justice as returning that which was owed, for
there are instances that we are not supposed to give back what we have received
from others, like doing evil in return for an evil done unto us. Socrates will
not agree with the dictum, ‘an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’
Moreover, Socrates does not also agree with those who said that justice is
about “doing good for one’s friends, and doing harm to one’s enemies.” This has
partly been refuted above in Crito
when Socrates said that ‘we can never be justified in doing harm on others.’
Moreover, Socrates said that we can be mistaken about our understanding of the
good of our friends, and we eventually end up doing those which really harm our
friends rather than do them good. Lastly, Socrates could not also agree with
Trasymachus’ definition of justice as doing the will of the strong. In fact,
Socrates even believes that the foundation of our society lies on the fact that
we are not self-sufficient, that is, on the fact that we all have our own
vulnerabilities and inherent weaknesses that can be supplied by the strengths
of others.
The Republic
then proceeds to describe justice as ‘doing one’s contribution for the
state.’ Plato compares the organic function of the body, where all parts
contribute to its proper functioning. In the same way, Plato argues that the
needs of the state have to be supplied by its members. Hence, the greater the
need of the state, the larger the state has to become. In Plato’s conception of
the state, each of the members has to discern his/her special skills and make
it his/her contribution for the state.
This is the reason why Plato would say that
‘weakness’ (cf. Bk. 2) is the foundation of the community. We come together and
form a community because we are not self-sufficient. This is a thought that that
has also been raised in Crito when Socrates
offers an argument for the importance of the law and social order where he had
the law speak about the contributions of the state in the well-being of every
individual like Socrates and Crito.
In the Republic,
Plato mentions that the survival of the state is assured by the coming together
of people who perform their own respective role for the state: the bakers,
farmers, blacksmith, soldiers, philosophers, artisans and others. It is
important for Plato that all these agents in the community are doing their part
because no one among us can possibly provide for all those things that we need
each day. Hence, he speaks about the insufficiency of each individual as an
important reason for the creation of the state. We come together and create the
state because we need each other to provide those things which we cannot
provide for ourselves.
With this, Plato (through
Socrates) argues that it is always better to do justice rather than injustice.
His critics are pessimistic on the thought that a particular person will unconditionally do justice rather than
injustice for it seems that people simply want to “appear” just and not really ‘to be’ just. We all wanted,
it seems, to appear just because of the social rewards which we get in
appearing as just and in the accompanying punishment that injustice begets. His
critics recall the ring of Gyges, which provides the power to make somebody
invisible, and argue that it would look more practical for most people to use
the ring not only to “appear just,” – that is, they will make themselves
visible when they perform justice; but will also use the ring to hide their
commission of injustice – that is, they will make themselves invisible when
they commit injustice that will enrich them personally. Hence, so they argue,
it seems that the more ideal state is: “to do injustice but to appear just,”
and the worst state is “when we suffer injustice and continues to appear unjust
(and thereby punished).”
Countering the above claim, Plato explains
that any act of injustice, even if it is hidden from the public eye, will
compromise the order of the state. Such compromise will affect all the members
of the state. When we destroy the social order (the just way of relating with others understood as doing that which is
expected of us for the preservation and enrichment of the social order) through
the non-performance of our roles in the polis,
we contribute to the state’s downfall which also includes our own. Hence, for
Plato, the mere appearance of justice will not really help the individual. It
is only when the individual is truly just that he works for the good of the
whole, which also means the betterment of his/her own self.
Moreover, it is worth noting that Plato’s
definition of justice is about the ‘performance’ of our roles; it is about the
realization of our functions and responsibilities inside the state. Justice, in
the Platonic sense, is about our own contribution. It is about doing what each
individual can do[1]
in order to contribute for the flourishing of the state which will also be
instrumental to the flourishing to the lives of individuals.
Society:
A Network of Giving and Receiving
Contractual theory
of a society: The Society as a regulator of the Freedom of its citizens
The coming of modernity has changed the
social landscape of most communities. It was Thomas Hobbes who thematically
outlined the nature of the human person as a self-interested being. He argues
that the human person, in the state of nature, is absolutely free. Moreover,
the human person is self-interested. He pursues that which is good for the
self, for it is this self-interestedness that assures the human person his/her
survival. Self-interest then is the primary motivator of the actions of the
human person.
Yet, Thomas Hobbes also acknowledges that
the human person, in his/her state of nature, is also naturally doomed towards
a war with another person. He would say that “the human person is a wolf to
another human person,” that is, human persons are in a constant war among
themselves. Each person’s freedom may
become an obstacle to the pursuit of the other, and the conflict could escalate
into wars. Wars then are mismanaged conflict that were unaddressed, or were at
least insufficiently addressed.
The role of the State then is to provide a
venue for compromise. In a state, every free individual enters into a contract
that allows him/her to give up particular expression of his/her freedom with
the reciprocal expectation that s/he will enjoy a degree of security. Locke
argues that freedom can only guaranteed by recognition of certain constraints.
Without a sufficient respect and recognition of constraints, freedom and
well-being are hardly guaranteed.
The role of the government (which Hobbes
calls as the Leviathan) then is
simply to manage our conflicts in order to avoid the wars. Though Hobbes and
Locke vary in their understanding of the tasks of a government, they are in an
agreement about the government’s minimal role of regulating the freedom of its
citizens so that they could avoid the eventuality of wars. In this
contractarian understanding of the state is not concerned with the pursuit of
the individual’s well-being. Pursuing individual goods is the work of the
individual and not of the state.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau furthers the
reflections of Hobbes and Locke, and looks at the human person in his state of
nature as a being who is both innocent and stupid. Rousseau believes that the
human person is by nature good, that is, s/he pursues his/her own goods, and is
not governed by any external standards of right and wrong. However, the human
person in the state of nature is also stupid, and it is only in his/her
association with others that s/he can educate himself/herself. Hence, the human
person has to enter into associations (like the family) in order to be
educated.
Sadly however, the society has the tendency
to corrupt the individual. Rousseau argues that the innocence of the individual
may be corrupted by the state as it is in the state where the individual may
start to develop his/her envy as s/he begins to compare the self with others.
Rousseau warns that we have to be careful about our human relations within a
state for, as Hobbes already warned, we can be potential aggressors against one
another. Contrary to Hobbes however, Rousseau teaches that in the state’s
regulation of the individual freedom, justice is assured if we look into the
natural rights of individual. The role of the state then is to ensure that the
rights of individuals are tightly guarded against abuses. Hence, laws are to be
enshrined in order to become arbiters on issues. Rousseau wants to do away with
personal governments for he is convinced that personal governments could lead
to some abuses. Rather, the impersonal law that has to be formulated via what
he calls the general will shall become the basis for our action. Once a law, it
shall command obedience even from among free citizens.
However, in the same way as Hobbes’
government is not concerned with redistributing the goods of the state to
ensure justice among the members, Rousseau’s view continues to be minimalist.
Though it is concerned with the good of all, it is rather ambiguous with regard
to individual and even state’s responsibilities to take care of the needs of
the state’s members. Instead, there is a tendency to look at the society in a
rather divisive way for such theory simply looks at the other members of the
community as potential offender, rather than defender, of my rights.
In a modern contractarian understanding of
the society then, the pre-modern conception that emphasizes the need to create
the society or a political community in order to achieve a certain degree of
sufficiency – which could impossibly be achieved by an individual and is not
fully addressed by the domestic community - no longer provides the paradigmatic
understanding of what a society should be. Modernity’s emphasis on the
capacities of the individual person veers away from the talk about our
insufficiencies and vulnerabilities. Instead, modernity has divinized the
capacities of the individual and argues that the individual could survive on
his/her own. Entering the society then is not consequential to the nature of
the human person. It is instead an anti-dote to the by-product of man’s natural
state: a natural consequence towards war with others. The society, in modern
contractual conceptions, is needed to ensure merely that we do not hurt one
another’s life and possessions. But, it also contributes to the increasing
prejudice against the talk of one’s inherent responsibilities to become
brother’s keeper for one’s neighbor.
Society
as a network of giving and receiving
It is modernity’s decreasing appreciation
of the language of mutuality, common good and responsibility for the other that
challenges contemporary moral and social philosophers, especially those within
the social teaching tradition of the Church, to launch a critique to the
dominant moral doctrine of contemporary societies. Most of the critics of the
dominant liberal tradition proposed to revisit the Thomistic-Aristotelian
tradition which holds that the human person is also a social being: the human
person is necessarily related to another human person. Following Aristotle, Aquinas
claims that there are two basic reasons why a human person needs a community:
a. Man needs others
for survival:
No one could have survived without the help of another human person. Our family
is our first human society, and we owe our survival from the people who first
took care of us when we were yet unable to care for ourselves.
b. Man needs others
for well-being:
No one is self-sufficient, and no one could fully provide all his/her needs.
This should be a reason for us to treat others with respect because the “other”
is a potential ally/helper in any of our human activity.
For Aristotle and Aquinas, the society is
important because it serves as a venue for mutual help. Coming together in a
society, it becomes possible for us to exchange our goods and skills in order
to fill the inherent lack and limitation of each one. In other words, the
community is the filler for the limitation of individuals.
Followers of Aquinas could agree with Hobbes
who said that the primary motivator of the human person into action is
self-interest. We do things because we are interested in them. However, we do
not simply start with interests. Our realization about our insufficiency (as
Plato said it) allows us to see our needs for others, and so, we enter into a
community. At the foundation of our community then is our inherent
insufficiency and vulnerability, which also consequently points to the necessity
that we work together.
Hence, the reason for common life is not
just the preservation of our own lives so that we could ably pursue our
interests, but rather also in discerning the best ways where we could
contribute and make such contribution for the state. It is true that I am
pursuing my own interests in the state, but I am at the same time aware that my
personal interests do not necessarily conflict with the common good, and in
fact, in those cases when my personal interest conflicts with the common good,
it may even be for my better benefit if I would have to give up parts of my
freedom in this case and uphold the common good.
The
Human Individual: Maturity of moral reasoning and the notion of the Common Good
An important contribution of this debate
between these conceptions about the human community is the emerging discussion
on how are we to understand ourselves as human individual. As individuals, we
are guided in our human actions via our understanding of what is the human good
for us. That which we see as good is the
one that becomes the end or the purpose of our human actions.
It is the understanding of the human good,
and the importance of such conception in justifying a certain conception of
justice, that allows modern philosophers to argue against its pre-modern
precursors for the priority of one’s interests and rights. Hobbes, Locke and
Rousseau are certainly correct in pointing out a possible excess or abuse in
the ancient conception of justice that almost ignores the individual’s
conception of what is good for him/her in favor of that which is beneficial for
the community – justifying such conception of course with the excuse that such
will be ultimately beneficial for the individuals concerned. Modern
philosophers however have pointed out that we could only hypocritically push
for the welfare of the individual if we will not recognize that individual’s
capacity to define what is really good for him/her. Authentic concern for the
individual’s well-being will mean that we allow that individual to define the
human good for himself or herself.
On the other hand, modernity seems to have
spawned the excessive zeal on the individual’s right to define the human good
for himself or herself. With modernity, anomie
(where the individual views oneself as
totally free from any connection or responsibility towards others) has also
emerged. Modernity’s individualist conception of the human good has also
contributed to the waning appreciation of the social nature of the human
person.
We are then reminded that the human person
is both an individual (hence accorded with a capacity to define that which is
good for him or her) and social (the human person is not, and could not be, an
isolated being). The human person, while given the capacity to pursue his/her
own flourishing, could not ignore his/her membership in a community, and such
membership is part and parcel of who s/he is as a human person. In the
definition then of what is good for me as an individual human person, I could
not also totally free myself from the fact that I am also a member of a
community and is thereby accorded with some responsibilities which flow from my
roles. Hence, when I make decisions as a person, I of course decide on what is
best for me as a concrete human person – Joel Sagut – but I could not ignore
the fact that part of such a decision is my role as a teacher, as an employee,
as a son, as a brother, as a husband and as a father. Some of these roles may
become a source of a dilemma in certain situations – as when the demand of work
will sometimes conflict with the need to be present in the school affair of my
child – but, it remains true that when I make decisions, I do not just make it
as an anomic individual but as a social being.
There is then an important reminder about
the development of our human capacities to reason out, and our capacity to
mature as a moral agent. We are first called – as the modern philosophers will
argue – to make decisions for ourselves, and yet we are also reminded that
making decisions require a certain degree of maturity in our reasoning. An
uninformed mind could not make a good decision – this is the reason why we do
not call it freedom when we let a four year old child cross a highway; it’s
abusive, rather than respectful of the child’s freedom, to do this.
This is an important point that Heidegger
and MacIntyre have both reminded us. Heidegger has reminded us that we are a Dasein – by being a Dasein, we are a cut
above the rest. Our being a Dasein makes us different from animals which lack
the capacity to recollect and to think for themselves that which is really good
for them. A hungry mouse would not have second thoughts about eating a piece of
cheese on top of the table – regardless if the cheese is poisoned or not; human
persons are expected to behave differently. Human persons are expected to raise
questions about the actions that they are about to do. It is in this sense that
our capacity to make decisions is called to improve. We are all entitled to
make decisions – and so we must exercise that capacity to really discern for
that which is really good for us.[2]
Moreover, Heidegger reminds us that we are
being-thrown-into-the-world. There are several aspects in our lives that are
beyond our choices. This means that the world we are in will always influence
the kind of decisions that we make. This then reminds us that when we make
decisions, we could not ignore the concerns that confront us in the here and
the now. We always make our decisions in context. Nevertheless, Heidegger
reminds us that our freedom allows us to go beyond our context. Yes, we decide
according to our contexts, but we are never determined by our contexts. A poor
student for example makes decision according to the limited resources that s/he
has. S/he knows that his/her decisions to go to school could be limited, but
such limitation will not prohibit him/her from entering quality schools. Having
been made aware of the limited resources, s/he, for example, would have to make
sure to grab and work for any possible opportunity to enter a quality school
for College. Such decision allows him/her to make the kind of decisions that
she takes. So, when she decides to spend much of her time for her studies
instead of going with friends to a mall, she manifests a degree of maturity in
her understanding of her own context. Heidegger then reminds us of this
important component – a good degree of sensibility towards who we are, where we
are, what we have, what we would want to achieve – that will allow us to decide
more appropriately. It calls us to mature as a moral agent in order to make the
proper decisions that we are supposed to make.
Lastly, Alasdair MacIntyre, offers another
important reminder about cultivating our minds in order to make good decision
about what is good for us. MacIntyre, affirming what Heidegger has said about
Dasein’s capacity to define the human good for himself/herself, and the need to
decide in context, also reminds us that as we mature in what he terms as independent practical reasoning, that
is, making your own decision about what to do in the here and the now, it is
important to be mindful that our interests and desires are also at the same
time formed. One fundamental responsibility of the moral agent is the kind of
exposure and formation that we provide for ourselves in order to begin
appreciating the things that we appreciate as good. Hence, MacIntyre calls for
a degree of custody over our senses
and our mind, and to orient ourselves with our responsibilities not just as an
individual but also as a social being. Hence, MacIntyre reminds us of the
importance of the concept of the common good in the development of our
independent practical reasoning – reminding us once again that we can be
vulnerable anytime and that the way we appreciate that which is good need not
be purely self-directed but should also be directed towards the common good.
Following Heidegger and MacIntyre then, we
are reminded to really make good decisions for ourselves, and it would be
unjust against us to be deprived of the capacity to make that decision for
ourselves. However, we too are reminded that our minds and desires are formed
by every exposure, every little action, every minute decision that we make. As
we mature in our capacity to decide for the things that we think to be good for
us, we are reminded to resist the temptation of a self-directedness that
compromise our social nature as a human person.
One important component of the human
person, especially if that human person is to live inside a community, is the
expression of his/her personal freedom and individuality. How shall an
individual human person function within a community? Hobbes and Rousseau have
already pointed out that though the human person is free (absolutely free in
fact), s/he would have to negotiate that freedom as soon as s/he enters into a
community. Hence, it would also be worthwhile to look into that freedom.
Martin Heidegger believes that the
beginning of human wisdom is in the realization that the human person, which he
calls as the Dasein, has two important realities: s/he is a being-in-the-world and a being-towards-death. Being-in-the-world
has several implications:
- Every
human person has a world: No
one lives in a vacuum. Rather, every human person has an immediate
environment, and such environment affects the thoughts and choices of the
person. This means that every human person lives in a context, and such
context is always unique.
Heidegger says that my world is purely mine. This explains why every human
person, no matter how proximate his/her environment with that of another,
maintain his/her uniqueness. No
two individuals are totally alike because no two individuals have exactly
the same world.[4]
- In
that world, there are other entities, which he divided into Dasein and mere entities. All
other things in the world (including animals) present themselves to the
human person as a ready-to-hand. We relate to the world via the world’s
practical significance in our life, that is, the world’s usability. The entities of this
world can serve as tools. But, there are also other Daseins in the world,
and they refuse our tendency to use. Other Daseins resists any attempt of
manipulation, and so they have to be treated as another free and
autonomous individual. We respect other Daseins in the same way as we want
ourselves to be treated. We need to practice intersubjectivity, that is,
every other Dasein is a being endowed with his/her own freedom. This means
that every Dasein is free to express his opinion, to resist our control
and manipulation. This means that we would need to deal with every Dasein singularly: only authentic dialogue can allow us to
become a Being-with-Others.
- We
are all THROWN-into-the-world. This
means that there are many aspects in our human existence that are beyond
our choice. We do not choose our nationality, our age, our race, and even
our surnames. More importantly, most of these things largely affect the
kind of existence that we live. Hence, Martin Heidegger says that we are
thrown to particular situations, which in most parts are not really
product of our choices and actions. Martin Heidegger refers to this as the
destining of Being. Being leads
us to where we are now, and our thrown-ness highlights the limitations of
our human freedom.
But, our being
thrown into the world is precisely the basis for Martin Heidegger’s concept of human freedom. If human persons are
thrown, which means that there are many aspects in our personal lives that are
not really product of our choices and actions, does this mean that we are less
free? For Martin Heidegger, our being thrown does not in any way diminish our
freedom. Our thrownness is part of our nature: that is who we are. However, we
remain to be free despite having been thrown. For Martin Heidegger, our
thrownness is the basis for our freedom. Our choices are always colored by our
context, by our world. No other person could impose his/her decision on what I
should do because I have my own
context. I am singularly thrown. However,
I need TO DEAL with my present world. He describes the condition of man as a
BEING-THROWN INTO THE WORLD…
For Martin Heidegger, freedom is
transcendence. We need to outgrow the present context where we are in. Human
life is but a continuous attempt to transcend our present situation. A man who
lazily refuses to transcend his present condition also loses his sense of
meaning in life. Being free means that I
should be able to TRANSCEND my current situation. Freedom means a constant attempt to push and extend my
boundaries. This is the reason why human growth and freedom go hand in hand. Only free individuals are able to grow
because they are the ones who are not afraid to push their current limits.
True
freedom means brings courage and bravery. A truly free individual is not
afraid to try new things. Certainly, new things are fearsome. New things bring
uncertainties. It forces us to face new horizons. In fact, NEW THINGS ARE
MONSTROUS and monsters are frightening because of their novelty. Any monster that has become familiar ceases to become a
monster but may even eventually become a friend. For Martin Heidegger, though
new things are oftentimes frightening, we need to embrace and welcome them into
our lives. It is in trying new things
that we grow as an individual. New challenges and new responsibilities are opportunities to become a better person,
they are occasions for us to become free. This means then that a truly free
individual is one who leaves his/her comfort
zone and attempts new things in his/her life. It is in being free this way
that we become better individuals.
Moreover, a being-towards-death means that the human person has a limited
existence. This life has an end. The realization of an end reminds us to
“care.” Finitude oftentimes, it ‘must’ in fact, leads us to appreciation.
Realizing that this life is a finite one, that it has an end, allows us to
appreciate the need to make plans for this life. We need to plan for our life
in order to make sense for it. We need to create and design priorities, for we
know that we can never do “all” things in this life.
Martin Heidegger is reminding us then that
as a free individual, we are limited beings. Freedom is a capacity to make
sense to the finite existence that we have, with due consideration and
attention to our thrownness, to our givens, to our contexts.
[1] Alasdair
MacIntyre, in his Dependent Rational
Animals, has pointed out that even the weakest members of the society could
“help” us learn more about ourselves. In that sense, even the weak contribute
to the betterment of the state. Hence, it is sad when we deprive them to
perform that role by simply disregarding them.
[2] It is important to emphasize this
because there are many people, especially young people who surrender this
capacity on behalf of what they see, hear and watch in the popular media. We
are oftentimes tempted to allow the wider culture to define for us that which
is really good. Peer pressure in school setting for example is an important
component of this. Pressure exercised by what we see in the social media is
another. We are always tempted to see the popular culture as definitive of what
is good or bad. It is to counter this tendency that Heidegger invites us to
become authentic Daseins.
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